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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Interstate Commerce CommissionCarriers-Blanket Area Rates
The ascertainment of rates offering maximum congruity among the
competing interests of producer, carrier and consumer has long been a
challenge to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Particularly in the
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field where developed natural resources can find a market only at some
distant point has the problem of rate regulation been difficult.
In Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States1 the Commission faced
the problem of determining a rate structure for coal-producing areas in
Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky, with markets located in northern Illinois and Wisconsin. Sections of each state were grouped together, and
all the mines within one section given the same rate to the particular
destination. Rates from each such area to the point of consumption were
then approved, but the differences in rates assigned to the areas were
admittedly not wholly explainable on their respective distances from
the destination points.2
Grouping all the mines in a particular area and giving each the same
flat rate to a given point has long been practiced.3 So-called blanket
areas are frequently set up by the carriers acting on their own inititative,
and where this has not been done, it may be required by the Com4
mission.
The Commission has found the blanket areas highly desirable because they encourage a more even and fuller development of the region;
simplify marketing by allowing dealers a wider range in their choice
of materials; and, by pitting in competition producers throughout the
producing district, stimulate rivalry, and thus provide a guaranty against
exorbitant prices and undue profits. 5 To the carriers, blanket area rates
offer through uniform treatment of all shippers in a large section certain administrative conveniences; through the right to haul at the same
rate though the line may be located more distant from the producer
than some other railroad, certain competitive advantages; and through
resulting production stimuli greater business potential. 0 The propriety
of so establishing areas is now firmly settled in the field of administrative rate making.
After the producing area is divided into blanket areas, the Commis169 S. Ct. 278 (1949). The case before the Commission is reported as Coal
I. C. C. 179 (1945).
to Beloit, Wis., andWis.,
Northern
Illinois, 263
and Northern
Illinois, supra note 1, at 185. For example,
2 Coal to Beloit,
rates approved from the Boonville group to Beloit were $2.39 per ton for a distance of 415 miles, while rates from the Fulton-Peoria group were set at $1.80 per
ton for a distance of 170 miles. Note that in the former case the distance is
almost two and one-half times that of the latter, yet the rate is only one and onethird larger.
' Illinois Commerce Commission v. United States, 292 U.S. 474 (1934) ; Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., 16 I. C. C. 512 (1909).
"United States v. Ill. Central R. R., 263 U. S. 515 (1924) ; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. United States, 245 U. S. 136 (1917).
'Wis. & Ark. Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 33 I. C. C. 33 (1915);
Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. So. Pac. Co., 22 I. C. C. 149 (1911); Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. B. & 0. R R., 16 I. C. C. 512 (1909).
' United States v. Il. Central R. R., 263 U.S. 515 (1924) ; Arlington Heights
Fruit Exchange v. So. Pac. Co., 22 I. C. C. 149 (1911) ; Hitchman Coal and Coke
Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., 16 I. C. C. 512 (1909)
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sion as a part of the process of establishing flat rates from each to the
consuming point, attempts to correlate the charges to be assigned to
the different blanket areas in such a manner that the over-all rate making
scheme best serves the interests of all concerned.
The fact that rates as finally approved reflect conclusions not premised wholly on consideration of the interests of the producer and carrier does not establish their invalidity. In determining rate differentials
the Commission has not only their interests to protect-the consumer is
also entitled to consideration. 7 Where he buys in an intensively competitive market, rates assume increasingly significant proportions, because the variance in price of a few cents per ton is often sufficient to
divert a contract from one producer to another.8 To make rates with
a primary regard for distance could eventually have the effect of eliminating practically all competition between producers, 9 with obviously
undesirable consequences to the consumer.
Recognizing this as an integral phase of the overall rate-making
problem, the Commission has consistently given weight to the consumer's interests, even when the resulting rate differentials are disproportionate to those which consideration only of distance and transporatation factors would dictate.' 0 This practice is specifically approved by the court in the instant case. 11
The influence of competition in the Commission's rate fixing process
found an interesting but typical'12 application in Birch Valley Lumber
Co. v. S. C. & M. R. R.13 There the blanket area of the B. & 0. R. R.,
main line serving the timber-growing region involved, was extended
only to lumber producers located on its main or trunk lines. Producers
B and D were well within the general blanket area, but were some 7 to
9 miles from the B. & 0. They had to pay in addition to the group rate
the charges of the S. C. & M., which carried their products to a point
on the B. & 0. The Commission found that in order to compete with
other producers B and D had to base their prices on the group rate
and absorb the charges of the S. C. & M., with the undesirable prospect
of possibly being driven out of business. The Commission concluded
that although the charges of the S. C. & M. were not unreasonable,
the refusal of the B. & 0. to extend the group rate to B and D was
7Coal to Illinois and Wisconsin, 232 I. C. C. 151 (1939) ; Andy's Ridge Coal

Co. v. So. Ry., 18 I. C. C. 405 (1910).

1 Coal

to Beloit, Wis., and Northern Illinois, 263 I. C. C. 179, 195 (1945).
'Illinois Coal Traffic Bureau v. Ahnappe & W. Ry., 204 I. C. C. 225 (1934).
" Id. at 240; Waukesha Lime and Stone Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 26

I. C. C. 515, 518 (1913).
12 69 S. Ct. 278, 288.
1"See also Indian Creek Valley Lumber Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., 126 I. C. C.
161 (1927); Tioga Coal Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., 101 I. C. C. 611 (1925); Swift
Lumber Co. v. F. & G. R. R., 61 I C. C. 485 (1921).
1- 144 I. C. C. 419 (1928).
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unduly prejudicial to them and unduly preferential to their competitors,
and entered an order requiring that their rates not exceed the rates
charged other competitors in the same general origin territory.
Decisions of the ICC are not necessarily final and may be taken
before the federal courts. But once it is determined that the Commission is acting within its statutory authority, the court's power to review
its findings of fact and rulings is extremely limited. 14 Congress intended to commit these problems to a permanent expert body and the
courts recognize that they have neither the "technical competence nor
the legal authority to pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken
by the Commission."' 15 Numerous examples of court deference to the
administrative expertise of the Interstate Commerce Commission reveal
a marked indisposition even to consider the amount of weight given to
each of the factors used in determining the justifiableness of a rate, and
this proposition seems particularly applicable where the problem involved concerns fixing of rates for competing areas.' 0
By reaffirming in the instant case its policy of rare interference with
the Commission's rulings, the court facilitates the reaching of the soundest possible solution to a problem for which it can hardly be hoped to
find a perfect one.
CHARLEs

L. FuLTON.

Anti-trust Laws-Requirements Contracts-Tests of Illegality
Section 3 of the Clayton Act' declares, inter alia, that "It shall be
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . ..
whether patented or unpatented . . . on the condition, agreement or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal
in the goods . . . of a competitor ... of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale... may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
Since its passage in 1914, the United States Supreme Court, while
not always denominating them, has had occasion to deal with two sepa1 I.C. C. v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 (1947) ;United States v. Chicago Heights
Trucking
310 U.S. 344 (1939).
"BoardCo.,
of Trade
of Kansas City v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 (1942).
1
United States v. Ill. Central R. R., 263 U.S. 515 (1924). Also see the statement of Mr. Justice Douglas in the instant case: "We would depart from our
competence and our limited function in this field if we undertook to accommodate
the factors of transportation conditions, distance and competition differently than
the Commission has done in this case. That is a task peculiarly for it." 69 S. Ct.
278, 289.
'38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S.C.§14 (1946).

